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THE GOVERNMENT MADE ME DO IT!: HAS BOYLE





W HEN A GOVERNMENT contractor manufactures a
product in compliance with a government contract,
the government contractor defense' provides the contrac-
tor with an absolute shield from liability for all deaths and
injuries caused by a design defect in the product.
Although the defense originated in the public works
projects, 2 its underlying policies and rationale have been
used to broaden its application to include not only mili-
I The government contractor defense is also known as the "contractor immu-
nity defense," the "contract specification defense," and the "government contrac-
tor immunity defense." This comment will refer to the defense as the government
contractor defense.
2 For a more detailed analysis of the development of the government contractor
defense and its uses, see A. L. Haizlip, The Government Contractor Defense in Tort
Liability: A Continuing Genesis, 19 PUB. CoNT. L. J. 116 (1989); George E. Hurley,
Jr., Government Contractor Liability in Military Design Defect Cases: The Need forJudicial
Intervention, 117 MIL. L. REV. 219 (1987); Michael Overly, Boyle v. United Technolo-
gies Corp.: The Turning Point for the Government Contractor Defense?, 21 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 935 (1988); Marshall S. Turner & Alan N. Sutin, The Government Contractor
Defense: When Are Manufacturers of Militay Equipment Shielded from Liability for Design
Defects?, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 397 (1986); Sue E. Corbett, Comment, All the King's
Contractors and All the King's Men: Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 14 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 499 (1989); R. Todd Johnson, Comment, In Defense of the Government Con-
tractor Defense, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 219 (1986); and Raymond A. Lopez, Note, Boyle
v. United Technologies Corp.: The Vitality of the Government Contractor Defense Continues,
40 MERCER L. REV. 753 (1989).
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tary equipment, but potentially any product contracted
for by the government.
This comment examines the government contractor de-
fense in six sections. The first section discusses the his-
tory and evolution of the defense. The second section
closely examines the Supreme Court's opinion in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp. ,' the first Supreme Court ruling
on the defense. The third section discusses the remaining
unresolved issues after Boyle and the conflict among the
circuit courts with respect to those issues. The fourth sec-
tion discusses the implications of the Boyle decision. The
fifth section presents arguments for limiting the scope of
the defense, and the final section suggests specific limita-
tions that could be placed upon the defense.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
A. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The government contractor defense originated as an
extension of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.4 Under
this doctrine, a plaintiff may not sue the government with-
out first obtaining the government's permission.5 When
Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in
1982, the government consented to suit for injuries
caused by the negligence of government employees act-
ing within the scope of their employment. 6 Thus, the
FTCA provides a broad waiver of the federal govern-
ment's sovereign immunity. However, several exceptions
limit this consent to suit, particularly the discretionary
function exception.7
In the leading case on the discretionary function excep-
3 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
Haizlip, supra note 2, at 117.
Id.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402, 2671-2680 (1982).
7 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). This section exempts "[a]ny claim . . . based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary func-
tion or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused." Id.
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tion, Dalehite v. United States,8 the Supreme Court estab-
lished a distinction between those acts that are
discretionary within the meaning of the FTCA and those
that are not discretionary. The Court held that decisions
involving the economic, political, or social effects of a pol-
icy or plan are discretionary, while decisions relating to
daily operations that do not involve policy considerations
are operational, and thus non-discretionary.9 Thus,
under Dalehite, if a decision is held to be an exercise of a
discretionary function, the government is immune from
suit for any injuries resulting from that decision because it
has not consented to suit under the FTCA.
B. AGENCY BASIS
The government contractor defense originated in the
public works cases and was based on agency principles.
The Supreme Court first recognized the defense in Years-
ley v. WA. Ross Construction Co. 10 In Yearsley, the Court held
that a contractor was not liable for the erosion of the
plaintiff's waterfront property."t The damage occurred as
a result of the contractor's construction of dikes in ac-
cordance with a government contract.' 2 The Court pre-
mised its holding on the fact that since the contractor was
an agent of the government, it was entitled to share in the
government's immunity.' 3 Since Yearsley, the government
contractor defense has been consistently recognized in a
long line of public works cases dealing primarily with
8 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In Dalehite, the Supreme Court held that the "discretion-
ary function or duty" cannot be a basis for suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Id. at 35-36. The Court also held that this function or duty included more than
the "initiation of programs and activities" and that it included "determinations
made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or
schedules of operations." Id. The Court reasoned that, "[wihere there is room
for policy judgment and decision there is discretion." Id. (footnote omitted).
9Id.
lM 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
1, Id. at 21.
12 Id. at 19-20.
13 Id. at 22.
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claims for the taking of property. 4
Beginning in the 1960s, courts began to recognize the
government contractor defense in product liability cases,
including actions involving military products.' 5 The de-
fense essentially extends government immunity to the
contractor. However, the rationale for this extension has
varied as the scope of the defense has broadened.
C. FERES-STENCEL DOCTRINE
Feres v. United States' 6 established the foundation for the
application of the government contractor defense to mili-
tary equipment. In Feres, the Supreme Court held that the
FTCA did not waive the government's immunity with re-
spect to injuries to servicemen incident to their military
service.' 7 Thus, the Feres doctrine prohibited members of
the armed forces who sustained injuries while engaged in
activities incident to military service from suing the gov-
ernment to redress those injuries.'8
The Court broadened the scope of immunity to third
party actions in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United
States.' 9 The Stencel Court ruled that the United States
could not be joined as a third party defendant when an
injured serviceman filed suit against a government con-
tractor.20 In extending its decision in Feres, the Court re-
lied upon three determinative factors: (1) the distinctive
11 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1963); Merritt,
Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1961);
O'Grady v. City of Montpelier, 474 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Vt. 1979); Green v. ICI
America, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Dolphin Gardens, Inc.
v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Conn. 1965).
15 See, e.g., Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967); Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), afd sub nom. Montgomery v.
Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968);
Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 364 A.2d 43 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), af'd, 381
A.2d 805 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), cert. denied, 384 A.2d 846 (NJ. 1978).
16 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
17 Id. at 146. See Hurley, supra note 2, at 231-33.
18 Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
is, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
20 Id. at 673-74.
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federal character of the relationship between the govern-
ment and members of the armed services; (2) the availa-
bility of the Veteran's Benefit Act,2' which places an upper
limit of liability on the government for service-related in-
juries; and (3) the effect that a suit by a member of the
armed services against the government would have on
military discipline. 22 Thus, Feres precluded service mem-
bers from suing the government for injuries sustained in-
cident to their service, and Stencel extended the
government's immunity to third-party indemnity claims.
D. CIRCUIT COURT FORMULATIONS
The two predominant formulations of the defense,
before Boyle, arose from the Ninth Circuit and the Elev-
enth Circuit. Although both of these formulations are
based on the Feres-Stencel doctrine, they define the ele-
ments of the defense differently.
In McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.,23 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a supplier of military equipment is not liable
for a design defect where the supplier can show that: (1)
the United States is immune from liability under the Feres-
Stencel doctrine; (2) the United States established or ap-
proved reasonably precise specifications for the equip-
ment; (3) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (4) the supplier warned the United
States about dangers in the government's specifications or
in the equipment that were known to the supplier but not
to the government.24
The court based its holding in McKay on several policy
grounds. First, the court said that holding contractors lia-
ble for these design defects would undermine the Feres-
21 38 U.S.C.S. § 101 (1981).
22 Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672-73.
23 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). Navy Lieuten-
ant Commander McKay was killed after ejecting from his burning RA-5C aircraft.
The autopsy showed that he probably died as a result of injuries sustained during
the ejection. McKay's survivors sued Rockwell for defective design of the ejection
equipment. Id. at 446.
24 Id. at 451.
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Stencel doctrine because contractors would pass the addi-
tional costs created by accidents on to the government. 5
Secondly, refusing to grant immunity would force the ju-
diciary into the role of second-guessing military decisions,
which could implicate separation of powers concerns.26
Thirdly, the court noted that military equipment often
pushed technology to its limits, resulting in risks greater
than those acceptable in commercial settings.27 Lastly,
the court argued that granting immunity gave the contrac-
tors an incentive to work closely with the government in
developing and testing new equipment.28
The McKay court even allowed the government contrac-
tor to invoke the defense where a defective design was se-
lected by the contractor and merely approved by the
government. 29 However, the McKay standard limited the
use of the defense to cases involving military equipment.3 0
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit altered the McKay ele-
ments in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp. 31 by adopting a
more limited defense under which the manufacturer could
avoid liability only by showing the following:
(1) that it did not participate, or participated only mini-
mally, in the design of those products or parts of products
shown to be defective; or
(2) that it warned the military of the design's risks and
notified the military of alternative designs, but that the
military, although forewarned, clearly authorized the con-
tractor to proceed with the design. 2
25 Id. at 449. If the contractor were held liable for injuries caused by a design
defect, it would pass this cost on to the government "through cost overrun provi-
sions in equipment contracts, through reflecting the price of liability insurance in
the contracts, or through higher prices in later equipment sales." Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 460.
28 Id. at 450.
29 Id.
3o Id.
31 778 F.2d 736 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988).
32 Id. at 745-46. The purpose of the first element was to allow the contractor to
show that the part it played was "so minimal as to excuse it from proving the
second part of the test." Id. at 746. The Supreme Court later criticized the Shaw
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In Boyle v. United Technologies," the United States
Supreme Court for the first time addressed the issue of
whether a government contractor is immune from liability
for design defects in products developed for the govern-
ment. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia attempted
to eliminate the confusion among the circuit courts by
clarifying the elements of the government contractor de-
fense. Although the opinion established the elements of
the defense, it did little to interpret their application.
III. BOYLE V UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
A. FACTS
In Boyle v. United Technologies,34 plaintiff's son, a United
States Marine helicopter copilot, drowned after his CH-
53D helicopter crashed into the ocean off the coast of Vir-
ginia." Although Boyle survived the immediate crash, he
drowned when he could not escape from the helicopter.36
Boyle and his men were trapped inside the helicopter be-
cause the escape hatch, which opened outward rather
than inward as required by government specifications, was
pinned by increasing water pressure as the helicopter
sank.37 Boyle's father brought a diversity action in federal
district court against the Sikorsky division of United Tech-
nologies Corporation, the manufacturer of the helicop-
court's formulation in Boyle. Boyk, 487 U.S. at 513. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's analysis, see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
The Shaw court also stated that it did not require the contractor to prove that
the government prepared the specifications or that it was involved in a "continu-
ous back-and-forth" development of the specifications. 778 F.2d at 746. Rather,
the court required the contractor to prove that it did not prepare the specifica-
tions, and the court held that the government's participation in the development
of the specifications may prove the defense if that participation was "sufficiently
great." Id.
The court added that the primary objective of the defense is to determine
whether a military judgment to proceed with a dangerous design had actually
been made. Id. If so, the contractor would be immune from liability. Id.
33 487 U.S. at 500.
34 Id.
5 Id. at 502.
36 Id.
.17 Id. at 502-03.
987
988 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
ter.38  Boyle alleged that Sikorsky had defectively
designed the emergency escape system by designing the
escape hatch to open outward instead of inward, thus
making it inoperable against the water pressure surround-
ing the submerged helicopter.3 9 After the jury returned a
general verdict for Boyle, the district court denied Sikor-
sky's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.40
The court of appeals reversed and remanded with in-
structions that judgment be entered for Sikorsky.4 ' The
court found, as a matter of federal law, that Sikorsky could
not be held liable for the allegedly defective design of the
escape hatch because Sikorsky had satisfied the require-
ments of the government contractor defense.4 2
B. OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court not only
clarified the elements of the government contractor de-
fense, it also reconsidered the justification for the
defense.
1. Justification for Government Contractor Defense
a. Feres Rejected
Before defining the elements of the government con-
tractor defense, the Supreme Court considered whether
the defense should be governed by federal law and, if so,
on what grounds. In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected
the Feres doctrine as the justification for the government
contractor defense.4 4 The Court held that the doctrine
produced results which were "in some respects too broad
and in some respects too narrow. '45 Specifically, the
- Boyle, 487 U.S. at 503.
39 d.
40 Id.
41 Boyle v. United Technologies, 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted,
479 U.S. 1029 (1987), vacated, 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
42 Id. at 415.
43 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500.
44 Id. at 510.
45 Id.
[57
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court deemed the doctrine too broad because it provided
immunity for injuries caused by any standard equipment
purchased from stock, 46 and too narrow because it en-
compassed "service-related injuries" while excluding in-
juries to civilians caused by the military.4 7 In other words,
a civilian could sue where military personnel could not on
the same facts.
b. Federal Law Governs
Justice Scalia announced that the court's justification
for the application of federal law depends upon a two-step
analysis. The first step involves identification of "uniquely
federal interests. "48 The second step requires determin-
ing whether a "significant conflict" exists between that in-
terest and state law.49
Traditionally, federal law has governed the United
States' obligations and rights under its contracts. 50 The
Court initially noted that, although liability of govern-
ment contractors to third parties has never been recog-
nized as involving a uniquely federal interest, such
liability bordered on two other areas that have been
deemed uniquely federal in character: (1) the rights and
obligations of the United States under its contracts; and
(2) the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in
the course of their duty.5 The Court said that displace-
ment of state law is justified in these areas because the
46 Id. This has given rise to the "stock order" exception to the government
contractor defense. Under this exception, if the government orders a standard
product from stock, or off the shelf, "it is impossible to say that the Government
has a significant interest in that particular feature." Id. at 509. "[E]ven injuries
caused to military personnel by a helicopter purchased from stock ... or by any
standard equipment purchased by the Government, would be covered." Id. at
510.
41 Id. "Since that doctrine covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries
caused by the military to civilians, it could not be invoked to prevent, for example,
a civilian's suit against the manufacturer of fighter planes, based on a state tort
theory .... Id. at 510-11.
48 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
41 Id. at 507.
- Id. at 504.
.5 Id. at 505.
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federal government's efficiency would be impaired if fed-
eral law did not govern federal contracts or if federal offi-
cials could not freely make decisions without fear of
liability.52 Finally, the Court recognized that this same
concern existed with respect to the liability of government
contractors because the same federal interest in "getting
the Government's work done" is implicated even when
the case involves an independent contractor rather than
either the government itself or a federal employee acting
within the scope of his employment.53
Justice Scalia stated that, standing alone, a unique fed-
eral interest would not suffice to displace state law.54
Thus, the second step of the Court's two-step analysis,
determining whether a "significant conflict" exists be-
tween the federal interests and the state law, is crucial.55
The Court rejected the use of the Feres doctrine to deter-
mine whether this significant conflict exists.56 Instead, the
Court relied on the discretionary function exception to
the FTCA.57
52 Id.
, Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505. The court analogized the liability of independent con-
tractors performing work for the federal government to the liability of federal
officials and concluded that tort liability arising out of the performance of a gov-
ernment contract is a unique federal interest, and thus subject to federal common
law. Id.
54 Id. at 507.
55 Id. The Court added that the conflict with federal interests need not be "as
sharp" as that required for pre-emption when Congress legislates "in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied." Id. If the contractor could comply
with both its contractual obligations and the state law duty of care, state law would
not be preempted. Id. at 509.
50 Id. at 510-11. "There is, however, a statutory provision that demonstrates
the potential for, and suggests the outlines of, 'significant conflict' between fed-
eral interests and state law in the context of Government procurement." Id. at
511.
57 Id. Under the FTCA, Congress authorizes suits for damages "against the
United States for harm caused by negligent or wrongful conduct of government
employees, to the extent that a private person would be liable under the law of the
place where the conduct occurred." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)).
Congress excepted from this consent to suit any claim based on the exercise, or
the failure to exercise, a discretionary function by a federal agency or government
employee. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988)). State law must yield to federal
law only where the contractor cannot comply with both; the government contrac-
tor defense is then applied to protect federal interests. Id.
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The Court then held that the selection of the appropri-
ate design for military equipment to be used by the
Armed Forces is a discretionary function within the mean-
ing of the FTCA, because it involves the balancing of
many "technical, military, and even social considerations,
including the trade-off between greater safety and greater
combat effectiveness." 58 The Court concluded that per-
mitting judicial second-guessing of these judgments
through state tort suits against contractors would result in
the contractors passing the financial burdens created onto
the government in the form of higher prices. 59
Having established that federal interests are implicated
in suits against government contractors, the Court then
determined that those interests are in conflict with the
state's definition of the contractor's duty of care.60 The
Court said that this duty of care conflicted with the duty
imposed by the contract, which was to deliver products
conforming to government specifications. 6 1 Therefore,
the Court concluded that the government contractor de-
fense should be controlled by federal law because it impli-
cates uniquely federal interests and there is a significant
58 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
59 Id. at 511-12. The Court reasoned that it makes little sense to insulate the
government from financial liability when the government produces the equipment
but not when it contracts for production. Id. at 512. Thus, if the contractors
could be held liable for design defects, Congress' purpose in excepting the exer-
cise of discretionary functions from liability would be circumvented.
"And we are further of the view that permitting 'second-guessing' of these judg-
ments through state tort suits against contractors would produce the same effect
sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption." Id. at 511 (citation omitted).
"The financial burden of judgments against the contractors would ultimately be
passed through, substantially if not totally, to the United States itself, since de-
fense contractors will predictably raise their prices to cover, or to insure against,
contingent liability for the Government-ordered designs." Id. at 511-12. "It
makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for the
judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the
Government produces the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the pro-
duction." Id. at 512.
60 Id. "[S]tate law which holds Government contractors liable for design de-
fects in military equipment does in some circumstances present a 'significant con-
flict' with federal policy and must be displaced." Id.
61 Id.
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conflict between those interests and state tort law. 62
2. Elements of the Government Contractor Defense
a. Adoption of McKay
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. ,63 the Supreme Court
adopted the Ninth Circuit's formulation of the govern-
ment contractor defense 64 developed in McKay v. Rockwell
International Corp.65 In McKay, the Ninth Circuit held that
government contractors are immune from liability for de-
sign defects in military equipment when: (1) the United
States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the
equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the
supplier warned the United States about dangers in the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the
United States.66
The first two elements ensure that the design feature in
question is considered by a government officer and not
merely by the contractor itself. Once this is established,
the discretionary function exception applies.67 The third
element is necessary to encourage a cooperative design
and development effort between the contractor and the
government. It also ensures that the contractor has no
incentive to withhold information from the government.68
62 Id.
63 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
Id. at 512.
65 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983).
- Id. at 451.
67 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. "The first two of these conditions assure that the suit
is within the area where the policy of the 'discretionary function' would be frus-
trated-i.e., they assure that the design feature in question was considered by a
Government officer, and not merely by the contractor itself." Id.
66 Id. Conveying that knowledge to the government might disrupt the contract,
but withholding it would produce no liability if state tort law were displaced. Id.
The third condition is necessary because, in its absence, the dis-
placement of state tort law would create some incentive for the man-
ufacturer to withhold knowledge of risks, since conveying that
knowledge might disrupt the contract but withholding it would pro-
duce no liability. We adopt this provision lest our effort to protect
discretionary functions perversely impede them by cutting off infor-
mation highly relevant to the discretionary decision.
Id. at 512-13.
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b. Rejection of Shaw
The majority of the Court considered, and expressly re-
jected, the government contractor defense enunciated by
the Eleventh Circuit in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.69
The Shaw test would bar suit only if: (1) the contractor did
not participate, or participated only minimally, in the de-
sign of the defective equipment; or (2) the contractor
timely warned the government of the risks of the design
and notified it of alternative designs reasonably known to
the contractor, and the government, although fore-
warned, clearly authorized the contractor to proceed with
the dangerous design. 70 The Court rejected this test be-
cause the design chosen may have reflected significant
policy judgments by government officials regardless of
who developed the design.7' The Court also rejected
Shaw to avoid penalizing, and thus deterring, active con-
tractor participation in the design process.72 The Court
felt that active participation would be hindered if contrac-
tors were required to identify all design defects or to par-
ticipate only minimally in order to avoid liability. 7
C. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENT
Justice Brennan based his dissent on three grounds.
First, he challenged the majority's conclusion that federal
displacement of state law in this area was justified.74
1. Displacement Not Justified
Justice Brennan recalled Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,"
in which the Supreme Court held that there is no federal
general common law and that the federal courts have no
69 Id. at 513 (citing Shaw, 778 F.2d at 736 (1985)).
70 Id. "While this formulation may represent a perfectly reasonable tort rule, it
is not a rule designed to protect the federal interest embodied in the 'discretion-
ary function' exemption." Id.
7. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
72 Id.
7 3 Id.
74 Id. at 516-18.
75 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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authority to develop rules of substantive law based on
their grant of diversity jurisdiction.76 Brennan argued
that Erie was most seriously implicated when, as in Boyle,
federal judges displaced the applicable state law with their
own rules of federal common law.77
He accused the Court of creating a new category of
federal interests out of a combination of two interests
whose origins predated Erie itself: the interest in adminis-
tering the United States' obligations and rights under its
contracts, and the interest in regulating the civil liability
of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their
duty.78 He argued that the broad extension of the gov-
ernment contractor defense was unwarranted because,
even where immunity was authorized by Congress, the
Court had restricted its scope to circumstances in which
the contributions of immunity to effective government
outweighed the harm to the individual citizen.79
In support of his argument that the displacement of
state tort law was not warranted in Boyle, Brennan referred
to Scalia's opinion just two months prior to Boyle in Puerto
Rico Department of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp.80
In Isla, a unanimous Court held that the "historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded... unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."81
The Court had emphasized that federal common law can
displace state law only in such narrow areas as those con-
76 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 517. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitu-
tion or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State." Id. (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 78).
77 Id.
71 Id. at 518-19.
79 Id. at 523. This limitation on the scope of immunity was necessary because
immunity contradicts the basic tenet that individuals be held accountable for their
wrongful conduct. Id. The extension of immunity to government contractors
"skewed the historical balance" between effective government and individual
harm. Id.
-0 485 U.S. 495 (1988).
81 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 517. Just as there is no federal pre-emption without a con-
stitutional text or a federal statute to assert it, federal common law cannot super-
sede state law out of"no more than an idiosyncratic determination by five justices
that a particular area is 'uniquely federal.' " Id. at 517-18.
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cerned with the rights and obligations of the United
States, interstate and international disputes implicating
conflicting rights of states or United States' relations with
foreign nations, and admiralty cases.8 2 The Boyle case did
not present any of these situations.
a. Burdens
Justice Brennan stated that the majority had cited no
authority for the proposition that costs passed on to the
government by government contractors would burden the
government in a way that justified extension of immunity
to the contractor.8 3 He noted that the Court had held in
other cases that even substantial indirect burdens were le-
gally irrelevant.8 4 He argued that the FTCA's retention of
sovereign immunity for the government's discretionary
acts did not imply a defense for the benefit of contractors
who participated in those acts, even though they might
pass on the financial burden to the United States. 5
b. Collateral Relationships
Federal law typically controls when the federal govern-
ment is a party to a suit involving its rights or obligations
under a contract.8 6 It is well established that the Court's
82 Id. at 518. "State laws should be overridden by the federal courts only where
clear and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot be
served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage
if the state law is applied." Id. (quoting United States v. Yanell, 382 U.S. 341,
352 (1966)).
IS d. at 527.
Id. Brennan recalled that the Court had rejected an analytically similar at-
tempt to construct federal common law out of the FTCA when it held in United
States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954), that the government's waiver of sovereign
immunity for the torts of its employees did not give the government an implied
right of indemnity from the employees, even though the financial burden placed
on the United States by the FTCA could be so great that government employees
should be required to carry part of the burden. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 528. "However
substantial such indirect burdens may be, we have held in other contexts that they
are legally irrelevant." Id. at 527.
', Id.
,' Boyle, 487 U.S. at 519. Brennan stated that federal law usually applies "when
the Federal Government is a party to a suit involving its rights or obligations
under a contract." Id.
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power to create federal common law controlling the fed-
eral government's contractual rights and obligations does
not extend to contractual relations that are collateral to
government contracts. Brennan pointed out that the
Court had previously declined to impose federal contract
law on relationships that were collateral to a federal con-
tract.88 The relationship between the parties in Boyle was
collateral to the government contract.89 Boyle was simply
a suit between two private parties, thus federal contract
law did not apply.90
Brennan characterized the majority's use of Yearsley9 t as
a "valiant attempt to bridge the analytical canyon" be-
tween what Yearsley held and "what the Court wishes it
had said."' 92 He argued that Yearsley had never been inter-
preted to grant immunity to the discretionary acts of
those who perform service contracts for the govern-
ment.9 3 Brennan alleged that it was "unlikely that the
Court intended Yearsley to extend anywhere beyond the
takings context, and we have never applied it else-
87 Id. "But it is by now established that our power to create federal common
law controlling the Federal Government's contractual rights and obligations does not
translate into a power to prescribe rules that cover all transactions or contractual
relationships collateral to Government contracts." Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 521. "The relationship at issue is at best collateral to the Government
contract. We have no greater power to displace state law government the collat-
eral relationship in the Government procurement realm than we had to dictate
federal rules governing equally collateral relationships in the areas of aviation,
Government-issued commercial paper, or federal lands." Id. (footnote omitted).
90 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 519. In Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977), the
Court held that state law should govern the contractual claim because only the
rights of private litigants were at issue, and the claims would have no direct effect
on the United States or its treasury. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 520 (citing Miree, 433 U.S.
at 25). A government contract was in the background, but the United States was
not a party to any of the suits, and the suits neither "touch[ed] the rights and
duties of the United States" nor had a "direct effect on the United States or its
Treasury." Id.
91 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
92 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 526. "In Yearsley, we barred the suit of landowners against a
private Government contractor alleging that its construction of a dam eroded
their land without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment." Id. at 524.
93 Id.
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where. ' 94 He added that Yearsley was not relevant to the
facts in Boyle because the contractor in Yearsley was "fol-
lowing, not formulating" the government's specifications,
and because Yearsley depended on an agency relationship,
which did not exist in Boyle.95
2. Use of Discretionary Function Has Far-Reaching Results
Secondly, Brennan criticized the majority for basing the
defense on the discretionary function exception and thus
rejecting the Feres doctrine. He characterized the opinion
as extending immunity to any contractor "so long as it ob-
tained approval of 'reasonably precise specifications'-
perhaps no more than a rubberstamp from a federal pro-
curement officer who might or might not have noticed or
cared about the defects, or even had the expertise to dis-
cover them." 9
6
Brennan argued that the newly defined defense was too
broad for several reasons. First, it applied not only to mil-
itary equipment but also to "any made-to-order gadget
that the Federal Government might purchase after
previewing plans." 97 Secondly, the defense barred suits
brought by both military personnel and by civilians in-
jured by a government contractor's defective design.98 Fi-
nally, the defense could be invoked regardless of how
9 Id.
9. Id. at 525. If the contractor in Boyle had merely manufactured the helicopter,
following the government's own in-house specifications, it would be analogous to
the contractor in Yearsley, although not analytically identical since Yearsley de-
pended on an actual agency relationship with the government, which was never
established in Boyle. Id. "The contractor's work 'was done pursuant to a contract
with the United States Government, and under the direction of the Secretary of
War and the supervision of the Chief of Engineers of the United States .... as
authorized by an Act of Congress.' " Id. (citing Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 19).
96 Id. at 515.
97 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 516. Brennan argued that the defense would apply not only
to military equipment but also to "any made-to-order gadget that the Federal
Government might purchase after previewing plans-from NASA's Challenger
space shuttle to the Postal Service's old mail cars." Id.
W, Id. "The contractor may invoke the defense in suits brought not only by
military personnel ... but by anyone injured by a Government contractor's negli-
gent design, including, for example, the children who might have died had re-
spondent's helicopter crashed on the beach." Id.
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obvious or how easily remedied the defect.99 As long as
the contractor did not discover the defect, and the specifi-
cations approved by the government were reasonably pre-
cise, the defense could be invoked as a complete shield
against liability no matter how unreasonably dangerous
the defect. 00
3. Court Should Refrain; Congress' Role
Third, Brennan referred to Congress' continued refusal
to pass legislation establishing a government contractor
defense and argued that the Court should refrain from
doing so. He pointed out that Congress had not super-
seded state law in this situation, and that, "if anything, it
had decided not to."''
In summary, Brennan characterized the majority's anal-
ysis as beginning and ending with an exception to a stat-
ute that was, in itself, not applicable. 0 2 He pointed out
the inconsistency inherent in the fact that plaintiffs could




10, Id. at 518. Brennan noted that Congress had remained "conspicuously" si-
lent and had resisted a "sustained campaign by government contractors to legis-
late for them some defense." Id. at 515. Attempted legislation included H.R.
4765, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. 2441, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R.
2378, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 5883, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984);
H.R. 1504, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); and H.R. 5351, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515 n.l.
102 Boyle at 529.
There is no more reason for federal common law to shield contrac-
tors now that the Government is liable for some torts than there was
when the Government was liable for none. The discretionary func-
tion exception does not support an immunity for the discretionary
acts of Government contractors any more than the exception for 'any
claim against the Government arising out of assault,' section
2680(h), supports a personal immunity for Government employees
who commit assaults.... In short, while the Court purports to di-
vine whether Congress would object to this suit, it inexplicably be-
gins and ends its sortilege with an exception to a statute that is itself
inapplicable and whose repeal would leave unchanged every rela-
tionship remotely relevant to the accident underlying this suit.
Id. (citation omitted).
10.3 46 U.S.C.A. 761 (1975).
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Boyle's helicopter had crashed three miles further off the
coast. 10 4 Under those facts, federal law itself would pro-
vide a tort remedy, but no government contractor de-
fense, against the same manufacturer for an accident
involving the same equipment.10 5
Brennan concluded that the tort system is premised on
the assumption that the imposition of liability encourages
the prevention of injuries when the expected costs of
those injuries exceed the cost of their prevention.'0 6 If
the system works as it should, government contractors
would design equipment to avoid injuries whose costs
would burden the government. 0 7 He also said that if
Congress shared the Court's assumptions and conclusion,
it could enact legislation to place limitations on the civil
liability of government contractors to ensure that such lia-
bility would not impede the ability of the United States to
procure necessary goods and services.10 8
IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES AFTER BOYLE
Although Boyle resolved the conflict between the circuit
courts concerning the elements of the government con-
tractor defense, the definition of those elements has been
subject to conflicting interpretations in subsequent cases.
For instance, the initial determination of what constitutes
a discretionary function is subjective. Circuit courts are
not consistent in determining how much approval is nec-
essary for the exercise of a discretionary function, or what
constitutes reasonably precise specifications.
104 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 529.
105 Id.; but see Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1233 (1988) (applied the government contractor defense in a suit brought
under the Death on the High Seas Act).
1- Boyle, 487 U.S. at 530. "[T]he Court's analysis is premised on the proposi-
tion that any tort liability indirectly absorbed by the Government so burdens gov-
ernmental functions as to compel us to act when Congress has not," Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 531. Congress has thus far refused to do so. Id. (citing H.R. 4765,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. 2441, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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A. WHAT IS A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION?
The threshhold question of whether the government
has exercised a discretionary function is problematic. Not
all decisions made by government employees are covered
by the discretionary function exception. The Supreme
Court has held that where there is room for policy judg-
ment and decision, there is discretion.'0 9 Thus, a govern-
ment decision, at a minimum, must involve judgment or
policy choice to fall within the discretionary function
exception.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle, the Fifth
Circuit decided Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp. 1to In Tre-
vino, the Fifth Circuit defined the discretionary function at
issue as the discretion involved in selecting an appropri-
ate design for equipment."' The court said that if the
government delegates its design discretion to a private
contractor, governmental approval of the contractor's de-
sign is not an exercise of a discretionary function. ' 2
B. DEFINITION OF APPROVAL
There is also conflict over how much approval is suffi-
cient to meet the standard of a discretionary function.
The cases following Boyle have held generally that the gov-
ernment must be an active participant in the development
of specifications in order for its approval of the specifica-
tions to be an exercise of discretion.
For example, in Trevino, "t 3 the Fifth Circuit interpreted
Boyle's "approval" requirement to mean that the govern-
ment has: (1) established reasonably precise specifica-
tions, (2) chosen a design feature, (3) exercised judgment
and policy choice, and (4) substantially reviewed and eval-
- See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1953).
110 865 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989).
1" Id. at 1485 n.100 (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500).
112 Id. at 1485. "If the government has chosen to delegate its design discretion
to a private contractor, however, the government does not exercise a discretion-
ary function by merely approving the contractor's work." Id.
",.3 Id. In Trevino, the families of five Navy divers who died in an accident aboard
a submarine sued General Dynamics. Id.
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uated the design." 14
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that the level of government review in Trevino was not suf-
ficient to constitute approval." 5 The Fifth Circuit held
that the government must be an active participant, by ac-
tively exercising its discretion, to meet the approval re-
quirement." 6 The Fifth Circuit felt that the absence of
review was critical in the Trevino case and held that mere
review for compliance with very general performance cri-
teria was not sufficient to satisfy the approval required by
the Boyle decision." 17
The district court in Boyle also held that the discrepancy
in knowledge between the Navy and General Dynamics
prevented the Navy from performing any substantial re-
14 Id. at 1486-87 n.12.
15 Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1487. Although the Navy developed the basic design
concept, General Dynamics did the actual design work on the diving hangar
aboard the submarine. Id. The contract required General Dynamics to make
working drawings of the hangar and the valve system, which were signed by a
government employee. Id. The contract also required General Dynamics to as-
sume full responsibility for all the technical research, to review its own work to
assure compliance and to conduct all quality assurance testing, including inspec-
tion before the submarine was issued to the Navy. Id. Prior to the accident, the
Navy did not perform or require a formal design or safety review of the system.
Id.
116 To support the requirement of active participation, the court looked to the
facts of Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d at 736, where the relationship
between the Navy and a military contractor was similar to the relationship in Tre-
vino. Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1482 (citing Shaw, 778 F.2d at 747). In Shaw, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that governmental approval was not an "informed military
decision" because the Navy relied too much on the contractor's advice. Shaw, 778
F.2d at 747.
Although the Supreme Court rejected Shaw's definition of the elements of the
defense in Boyle, it never indicated that the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of
"approval" was wrong. Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1483 n.8. In fact, the Supreme Court
denied a petition for writ of certiorari and a petition for rehearing in the Shaw case
after its decision in Boyle. See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 487 U.S. 1233
(1988) (denial of petition for writ certiorari); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,
487 U.S. 1250 (1988) (denial of petition for rehearing).
11 Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1487 n.14. The district court held that the contracts left
the design entirely to the discretion of General Dynamics, because the Navy set
only general performance standards, and left the details for General Dynamics to
determine. Id. at 1487. Although government employees signed each page of the
working drawings to indicate their approval of the design, the district court held
that the level of review was not sufficient to constitute approval as contemplated
by the discretionary function exception. Id.
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view of the specifications." 8  That court, however, said
that the question was not the quality of the government's
review, but whether the government actually exercised
discretion." 9 The court cautioned, though, that using un-
qualified people to review and approve a design may be
evidence that the government does not intend to exercise
discretion but is merely rubber-stamping the contractor's
design specifications.120
The Fifth Circuit also held that "rubber stamp" ap-
proval failed to meet the Boyle standard of approval.' 2 '
The Fifth Circuit determined that the government con-
tractor defense required a more active exercise of discre-
tion than a mere rubber-stamping of the contractor'swork by the government.' 22 It based this holding on the
I'8 Id. at 1486-87 n.12.
119 Id. at 1487. If the government intended to exercise its discretion over the
design, and the official undertakes to substantially review the design, and to evalu-
ate and approve it, the first element of the test is satisfied even if the official doing
the review was incompetent or negligent. Id.
120 Id. at 1486-87 n.12.
12, Id. at 1481. "That Boyle requires more than a rubber stamp is clear from its
formulation of the elements of the defense, each of which serve to locate the exer-
cise of discretion in the government." Id.
122 Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1481. The Fifth Circuit held that the mere retention of
the right of final approval, without a substantive review, was not sufficient to es-
tablish the defense. Id. at 1480. The court stated that the government exercised
its discretion over the design when it actually chose a design feature. Id. at 1480.
The government delegated the design discretion when: (1) it purchased a prod-
uct designed by a private manufacturer; (2) it contracted for the design of a prod-
uct or a feature of a product, leaving the critical design decision to the private
contractor; or (3) it contracted out the design of a concept generated by the gov-
ernment, requiring only that the final design satisfy minimal or general standards
established by the government. Id.
The mere signature of a government employee on the approval line of a draw-
ing, without more, does not establish the defense. Id. If the contractor exercised
actual discretion over the defective feature of the design, then the contractor will
not escape liability via the defense, the government's rubber stamp on the design
drawings notwithstanding. Id.
It would be absurd, then, to fashion a rule that allowed liability when
the specifications were not sufficiently precise or when the contrac-
tor deviated from the specifications while disallowing liability when
the federal officer signing the design approval did not review or un-
derstand the specifications or care whether the contractor deviated
from them.
Id. at 1481.
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fact that the purpose of the defense was to protect the
government's discretionary function and, therefore, ap-
proval under the defense must constitute a discretionary
function. 23 The court stated that mere acceptance was
not a discretionary function because the government was
not making a policy judgment as required by Boyle. ' 24 The
Fifth Circuit also argued that the third element of the de-
fense supported an active exercise of discretion by the
government, by requiring that the contractor warn the
government when the contractor has information which
the government lacks.12
5
The Fifth Circuit referred to McKay v' Rockwell Interna-
tional Corp. ' 26 in defining "approval." In McKay, the Ninth
Circuit held that the defense was not available to the con-
tractor who built a dam that later collapsed. 127 The Mc-
Kay court held that the defense applied when the United
States reviewed and approved a detailed set of specifica-
tions. 128 Even after McKay, however, it still was not clear
how much approval is necessary, nor what facts constitute
that approval.
In contrast to Trevino, the Fourth Circuit in Kleemann v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.,'2 9  held that the Navy had exer-
123 Id. When the government merely accepts decisions made by a government
contractor, without any substantive review or evaluation, then the contractor, not
the government, is exercising discretion. Id.
124 Id. If the government delegated the design discretion to the contractor,
then the government could not claim it had exercised a discretionary function
unless it had also performed a substantive review or evaluation of the design. Id.
at 1480.
125 Id. at 1481. This element contemplates that the government's approval of
the design will involve informed decisions and considered choices. Id.
The primary purpose of the warning element is to enable the government to
make determinations as to the design and use of military equipment based on all
readily available information. Id. The Supreme Court's inclusion of a warning
element must indicate that approval requires some level of evaluation and review.
Id.
26 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
'27 Id. at 450. The contract specified location, height, and some performance
requirements of the dam, but left the design, materials, and method of construc-
tion to the discretion of the contractor. Id.
128 Id. According to the court, when only minimal or very general requirements
are set for the contractor by the United States, the defense is not applicable. Id.
121, 890 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953 (1990). Captain
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cised sufficient approval to satisfy the discretionary func-
tion exception.3 0 Beginning with bids for the F/A-18,
Navy engineers met with each contractor for extended
discussions of their proposals.' 31 Final design contracts
for the aircraft incorporated McDonnell Douglas' original
proposal as modified during extensive negotiations with
the Navy. '3 2
During design development, McDonnell Douglas was
required to submit detailed engineering drawings to the
Navy.13 3  Navy approval was required for all changes to
the design or specifications of the aircraft. 3 4  The
Kleemann court declared that governmental participation
in the various stages of the aircraft's development had es-
tablished the government contractor defense.13 5
Other jurisdictions have also dealt with the definition of
approval. In Deniston v. Boeing Co.,' 36 the court observed
that the purpose of the approval component of the Boyle
test is to assure that the design feature in question was
considered by a government officer, not merely by the
Kleemann, a U.S. Navy pilot, was killed when he lost control of his F/A-18 aircraft
during landing. Id. at 700. The plane left the runway and overturned. Defendant
McDonnell Douglas Corporation had designed the plane for the Navy. The Navy
concluded that Captain Kleemann's accident was partially caused by the failure of
the planing link assembly on the main landing gear. Id.
130 Id.
13, Id. at 701.
132 Id.
133 Id.
'3, Kleeman, 890 F.2d at 701.
135 Id. The more intimately involved the Navy was at various stages of the de-
sign and development process, the more likely it would be that the government
approval requirement was met. Id.
It is this salient fact of governmental participation in the various
stages of the aircraft's development that establishes the military con-
tractor defense. . . . Where, as here, the Navy was intimately in-
volved at various stages of the design and development process, the
required government approval of the alleged design defect is more
likely to be made out .... As a final matter, extensive governmental
participation provides tangible evidence of the strong federal inter-
est which justifies the creation of a federal common law defense for
government contractors in the first place.
Id.
1 No. 87-CV-1205, 1990 WL 37621 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1990).
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contractor itself.' 37 The Deniston court held that the ap-
proval component is satisfied if either the government it-
self selected or proposed the allegedly defective design
features or if those design features were approved by the
government after active consideration.' 3 8  Active consid-
eration may be demonstrated by a "back and forth" dis-
cussion between the government and the contractor. 3 9
The Third Circuit held that the approval requirement
was satisfied in Maguire v. Allison Gas Turbine.140  In
Maguire, the plaintiff alleged that a defectively designed
engine ball bearing caused a helicopter crash.' 4' The
plaintiff argued that the government's approval of the
change in the bearing was only a rubber stamp approval
because the change originated with the contractor. 42
The Third Circuit found that the approval of the
change was an exercise of a discretionary function even
though the change originated with the contractor. 43
Thus, the court held that the changes originating with the
contractor were not automatically "rubber-stamped," but
were approved by the government. ' 4 4
137 Id. at *4.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 912 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1990). Appellant Edward Maguire was forced to crash
land his helicopter. Two days after the crash, an Army flight surgeon certified that
Maguire was able to return to active flight status. Two days later, Maguire was
seriously injured when he lost consciousness while driving his motorcycle.
Maguire alleged that his motorcycle crash was a result of injuries he sustained in
the helicopter crash and that Hughes and Allison were responsible for the injuries
in both accidents. Id. at 68.
141 Id. at 69.
142 Id. at 71. The rationale behind the rubber stamp exception to the defense is
two-fold. The Supreme Court stated that it is clear that where the government
rubber stamped a design proposed by a contractor, the officials had not per-
formed a discretionary function. Id. at 72. The Maguire court stated that the mere
fact that a design proposal originated with the contractor is not enough for the
rubber stamp exception to apply. Id. at 72 n.2.
143 Id. at 72. The court based its holding on the fact that the military specifica-
tions contained detailed design and performance specifications for the engine,
and that the government reviewed and approved the proposed design along with
every proposed design change, and also subjected the engine to stringent qualifi-
cation testing. Id.
144 Id.
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Therefore, the amount of participation by the govern-
ment in the actual design process is very important in de-
termining whether the government's approval rises to the
level of a discretionary function. The amount of partici-
pation varies from an active participant to a passive par-
ticipant, with the contractor being potentially liable
depending on how a particular circuit court views that
participation.
C. DEFINITION OF REASONABLY PRECISE SPECIFICATIONS
Another key to determining whether approval rises to
the level of a discretionary function is whether the specifi-
cations being approved are sufficiently precise so that the
government can be said to be making a policy judgment.
Detailed discussions between the contractor and the gov-
ernment have been held to produce reasonably precise
specifications.145
In a post-Boyle case, Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.,' 46 the Fourth Circuit held that the government con-
tractor defense applied to shield the contractor from lia-
bility when specifications evolved along with the
development and production of the aircraft.' 47 The court
145 In Boyle, the Fourth Circuit held that the contractor had demonstrated that
the Navy had approved reasonably precise specifications where the contractor and
the Navy had engaged in detailed discussions to develop detailed specifications.
792 F.2d at 414-15.
146 890 F.2d 698. Plaintiffs decedent died when his F/A-18 aircraft left the run-
way and flipped during landing. Id. The Navy concluded that the accident was
caused in part by failure of planing link assembly on the main landing gear. The
plaintiffs contended that the landing gear did not conform to reasonably precise
specifications contained in the Navy's original contract with McDonnell Douglas.
Id. at 700.
The contractor argued that specifications proffered by plaintiff were not the rea-
sonably precise specifications required by Boyle because such general require-
ments do not tell the contractor what to build or how to design the product. The
contractor contended that the accident aircraft incorporated all the current Navy-
approved landing gear designs and modifications through date of delivery. Id.
147 Id. The Fourth Circuit defined the issue as whether the landing gear con-
formed to the ultimate design specifications, rather than to qualitative precatory
specifications used in the procurement process. Id. The court held that the con-
tractor's working drawings, which incorporated general qualitative specifications,
were reasonably precise specifications because they included all subsequent draw-
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noted that military hardware does not suddenly spring
into being from initial design and procurement specifica-
tions, but evolves through drawings, blueprints and mock-
ups agreed upon by the parties. 48
The court distinguished general, qualitative specifica-
tions from the "detailed, precise and typically quantitative
specifications for manufacture of a particular military
product."'' 49 The court held that the general, qualitative
specifications contained in the documents cited by the
plaintiffs were merely initial theoretical phases of develop-
ment, which were incorporated by reference into the full
scale development contracts issued to McDonnell Douglas
for the development of the F/A-18. °50 The court stated
that "[w]here the military procurement process involves
this kind of continuous exchange between the contractor
and the government, the process itself becomes persua-
sive evidence that the product conformed to precise
specifications." ' 5
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Trevino
that there had been inadequate review of the design draw-
ings to establish the defense, the Fourth Circuit held in
Kleemann that the Navy had performed extensive review of
detailed design drawings submitted by McDonnell Doug-
las.15 2 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the government
ings and modifications to initial specifications as approved by the government. Id.
at 702-03.
148 Id. at 702. The court noted that the ultimate design of the product is deter-
mined not only by the original procurement and contract specifications but also
by specific, quantitative engineering analysis developed during the actual produc-
tion process. Id.
149 Id. at 703 (quoting Shaw, 778 F.2d at 745). "Only the detailed, quantitative
specifications, and not those calling for such vagaries as a failsafe, simple or inex-
pensive product, are relevant to the contractor defense." Id. at 703.
- Id. at 702. This contract also required McDonnell Douglas to submit de-
tailed design drawings to the Navy for approval as their general specifications be-
came embodied in the actual landing gear. The Navy reserved the right to reject
drawings and to require revisions and modifications. Id. The court held that
these working drawings, and not simply the general, qualitative specifications
from the procurement stage, comprised the reasonably precise specifications con-
templated by Boyle. Id.
us, 890 F.2d at 702.
152 Id.
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did not turn over its discretion or the military decisions to
a contractor.'5 3 Thus, the court held that the Navy exer-
cised complete discretion over suggested design changes
in connection with the landing gear design, and that the
government contractor defense applied.5 4 A federal dis-
trict court in New York, in Deniston v. The Boeing Co.,1
55
adopted Kleemann's definition of reasonably precise speci-
fications. 56 The Deniston court defined quantitative speci-
fications as "detailed, precise" specifications to be used
for manufacturing. 57 The court adopted the Kleemann
holding that only these detailed, quantitative specifica-
tions were relevant to the government contractor
defense.' 58
The Fifth Circuit addressed the question of reasonably
precise specifications in Smith v. Xerox Corp.'5 9 In Smith, the
Fifth Circuit held that Xerox had sufficiently demon-
strated governmental approval of reasonably precise spec-
ifications for the VIPER simulator. 60
The Fifth Circuit consulted pre-Boyle cases to determine
what constituted reasonably precise specifications, since
the Supreme Court in Boyle did not give much guidance
on the interpretation.' 6' The Fifth Circuit recalled the
Ninth Circuit's decision in McKay, where the Ninth Circuit
said that the contractor would be subject to strict liability
1'5 Id. The contract data requirements list specifically required that landing
gear design reports and landing gear specifications be submitted for Navy review
and approval. There were also periodic design review meetings between the Navy
and the contractor. Id. at 702-03.
154 Id.
155 No. 87-CV-1205, 1990 WL 37621 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1990).
1-56 Id. at *5. The Kleemann court stated that "only detailed quantitative specifi-
cations ... are relevant to the government contractor defense". 890 F.2d at 703.
'5 Deniston, No. 87-CV-1205 at *5. The Deniston court cited Kleemann as distin-
guishing general, qualitative specifications from the detailed, precise and typically
quantitative specifications for manufacture of a particular military product. Id. at
*6.
1 - Id.
159 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989).
1o Id. at 137. Smith was a suit for personal injuries arising from the malfunc-
tioning and premature discharge of a VIPER anti-tank weapon simulator used
during military training exercises. Id. at 136.
wtId. at 137.
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for the design defect if the United States neither set speci-
fications for the system (other than general outlines of
what type of system it required) nor approved the con-
tractor's final reasonably detailed specifications by exam-
ining and agreeing to a detailed description of the
workings of the system. 162
The Fifth Circuit said that "[t]he government contrac-
tor defense requires only that the government approve
reasonably precise specifications."'' 6 3 The court held that
Xerox met its burden of proof on the defense because
Xerox incorporated the government's environmental
specifications for the VIPER into its production
contract. '64
The characterization of a given defect as either a fatal
defect, a design defect, or a manufacturing defect is also
critical to the defense. The government contractor de-
fense does not apply to manufacturing defects because
products with manufacturing defects do not conform to
government specifications.' 65 If the defect is one of de-
sign, the defense applies provided its elements are met.
Cases have differed on how to distinguish between these
two types of defects.
For instance, in Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp.,' 6 6 the
plaintiff alleged that wire-chafing caused the crash of an F-
16. 167 The Eleventh Circuit held, as a matter of federal
common law, that a manufacturing defect consists only of
"aberrational" defects and not those that occurred
162 Id. at 138 (quoting McKay, 704 F.2d at 453).
163 Id.
-6 Id. The Fifth Circuit stated that, although Xerox failed to produce complete
specifications for the original VIPERs it manufactured, Xerox did produce a list-
ing of those specifications, a copy of the original government performance crite-
ria, and a production contract furnished by Xerox for a series of VIPERs
containing specific reference to government approved specifications. Id. In addi-
tion, an employee of Xerox testified that the Army reviewed and approved the
drawings and specifications prepared by Xerox. Id.
165 "We also note that the rule enunciated here does not relieve suppliers of
military equipment of liability for defects in the manufacture of that equipment."
McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
66 878 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030 (1990).
167 Id. at 1314-15.
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"throughout an entire line of products."' 168 The Harduvel
court found that wire chafing in the F-16 was a design de-
fect, not a manufacturing defect, based on the fact that it
was common throughout the production line.' 69 The
court concluded that the government contractor defense
applied, and that the contractor was immune from suit.1
7 0
However, in Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc.,t the
Fifth Circuit held that voids found in a batch of mortar
casings were manufacturing defects, rather than design
defects, and concluded that the government contractor
defense did not apply.' 72 The Fifth Circuit considered the
Harduvel definition "unfortunate," because "shoddy work-
manship" could produce a defect throughout an entire
line of production, as in the mortar shells at issue in that
case. 173
D. SPECIFICATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT OR COMPONENT?
It is also unclear whether the stock order exception to
- Id. at 1317. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished design defects and manufac-
turing defects based on the distinction between an intended configuration (de-
sign), and an unintended configuration (manufacturing) that may produce
unintended and unwanted results. Id.
169 Id. at 1318.
170 Id. The Air Force issued general performance specifications, and General
Dynamics responded with quantitative specifications, including drawings and
blueprints. Id. at 1320. The Eleventh Circuit held that the first element of the
defense was met when the contractor incorporated government specifications into
a design that "the government subsequently reviewed and approved." Id. at 1320
(citing Smith, 866 F.2d at 138).
The government's specifications contained a general proscription against chaf-
ing that applied to all aircraft. Both the industry and the Air Force acknowledged
that wire tracking chafing had long been a problem both in industry and the Air
Force. Despite its full knowledge of the chafing problem in the design of the air-
craft, the Air Force continued to purchase F-16s after 1979. Id. at 1318. The gov-
ernment reviewed and approved the design and production methods proposed by
General Dynamics. Id. at 1320.
17, 913 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1990).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 247. "Defects of this nature are clearly the result of the manufacturing
process, not the design process." Id. "Where a defect is merely an instance of
shoddy workmanship, it implicates no federal interest. This distinction between
'aberrational' defects and defects occurring throughout an entire line of products
is frequently used in tort law to separate defects of manufacture from those of
design." Id.
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the defense is applicable to the entire product or to com-
ponents of that product. This question could be very im-
portant when the failure is due to an identifiable
component in a product. Components are often manufac-
tured by more than one contractor and integrated into the
final product.
The Fifth Circuit addressed this question in Trevino.' 74
The court recalled the Supreme Court's holding that the
government does not exercise a discretionary function
when it orders an item from stock. 175  The Fifth Circuit
then held that where reasonably precise specifications
called for a stock component, the government contractor
defense is not applicable because the choice of that com-
ponent would not then be the exercise of a discretionary
function. 17 6
In contrast, the district court in Neiman v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp.' 77 held that the aircraft as a whole, rather
than its components, was the basis for determining
whether reasonably precise specifications existed. 78 The
court held that the product at issue was the aircraft, not
the asbestos strip components, and that the decision to
use these strips was a discretionary function. 79
174 865 F.2d at 1474.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 721 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D. Ill. 1989). The plaintiff sought recovery for the
wrongful death of her husband, alleging that he died from asbestosis and lung
cancer caused by exposure to asbestos during his employment. Plaintiffs dece-
dent, Vincent Niemann, was a civilian repairman, working on aircraft manufac-
tured by General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas. His work consisted of
cleaning and repairing engine cowlings which included replacing asbestos strips.
After his retirement, Mr. Niemann was diagnosed with lung cancer, and he subse-
quently died six months later. Id. at 1021.
178 Id. at 1023. "The products at issue before the court are the aircraft them-
selves, and not each individual component part, nor is this a situation wherein the
government merely ordered a quantity of a product." Id.
It is clear that the procurement of the aircraft at issue involved a
great deal more than merely a procurement officer contacting Gen-
eral Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas to order a quantity of these
aircraft, and that the aircraft in question were indeed 'military equip-
ment' and not, as plaintiff suggests, merely 'stock products.'
Id. 79 Id. The court held that the government contractor defense applied even
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF BOYLE
A. CIVILIAN CLAIMS PRECLUDED
The Supreme Court's decision in Boyle opened the door
to non-military applications of the government contractor
defense and the preclusion of civilian claims and created
great uncertainty about the future application of the gov-
ernment contractor defense. Civilian claims have already
been barred in cases subsequent to Boyle. For example, in
Garner v. Santoro,is0 a civilian spray painter employed by
the Navy brought suit for systemic injuries incurred due
to inhaling the vapors of the paint.' 8 ' The Fifth Circuit
held that Garner's civilian status did not automatically
preclude the application of the government contractor de-
fense in light of Boyle.182 In Nicholson v. United Technologies
Corp.,83 the district court held that a federal civil service
technician, injured while repairing helicopter landing
gear, was barred from suing by the government contrac-
tor defense.'8 4 In Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. ,185
the district court held that the defense was applicable to
bar recovery by a civilian aircraft repairman's estate for
his wrongful death which was allegedly caused by asbestos
exposure during the course of his employment with the
government.1
8 6
though the asbestos strips were purchased commercially. Id. at 1023-24. Com-
mercial purchase was neccessary because there was no military specification for
the strips. Id.
180 865 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1989).
181 Id. at 631-32. "Garner had chronic hepatitis, chronic liver abnormalities,
and chronic pancreatitis." Id. at 632. (footnote omitted). Garner's doctor stated
that it was his opinion that "the toxicity of the Seaguard epoxy paint caused Gar-
ner's chronic pancreatitis, his hepatitis, and his liver damage." Id.
182 Id. at 637. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle,
which "precludes us from adopting Garner's argument that his civilian status au-
tomatically prohibits Seaguard from asserting the defense." Id.
IlS 697 F. Supp. 598 (D. Conn. 1988).
Id. at 605.
' 721 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D. I11. 1989).
186 Id. Plaintiff's decedent was a civilian who repaired aircraft and was exposed
to asbestos in the aircraft. He subsequently died of lung cancer. The district
court held that the government exercised a discretionary function by allowing the
aircraft to contain asbestos, so that the defense granted immunity to the contrac-
tor. Id.
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B. APPLICATION TO NON-MILITARY EQUIPMENT
In Boyle, the Supreme Court held that the procurement
of equipment, not just military equipment, was a uniquely
federal interest. 187 The Court's decision was ambiguous
as to whether the government contractor defense applied
only to military products and military contractors or ex-
tended to any product contracted for by the govern-
ment.'88 At least one circuit has already encountered this
issue. In Garner,'89 the Fifth Circuit said Boyle applied to a
variety of products but did not address whether those
products had to be military products. The Fifth Circuit
cited cases where the contractor had been held immune
from suit even before the Boyle decision. These examples
included vaccines, 90 front end loaders,' 9 ' tractor-bulldoz-
ers,' 92 night vision goggles,'9 3 and pizza dough mixers.' 94
In all these cases, the products were manufactured for the
government, even though some of them were not specifi-
cally military products. However, the Garner court
dodged the issue by finding that the paint was military
equipment because it was used on Navy ships.' 95
VI. ARGUMENTS FOR LIMITATION OF THE
DEFENSE
There are many compelling arguments for limiting the
government contractor defense. First, civilians lack the
protection provided to military personnel under the Vet-
eran's Benefit Act. This leaves an injured civilian without
187 487 U.S. at 507. "That the procurement of equipment by the United States
is an area of uniquely federal interest does not, however, end the inquiry." Id.
188 Id. at 510-12. The opinion used the terms "military contractor," "govern-
ment contractor," and "defense contractor" apparently interchangeably. Id. at
512. The examples used in the opinion concerned injuries to civilians caused by
noise from "fighter planes." Id. at 510-512.
865 F.2d at 635.
190 Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986).
'91 Tillet v.J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985).
1912 Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982).
Zinck v. ITT Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Casabianca v. Casabianca, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
Garner, 865 F.2d at 637-38.
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a remedy if state tort law is displaced. Second, military
personnel do have reasonable expectations that their
equipment will not fail due to a design defect. Third,
faulty products can cause several problems, such as (1) an
increase in public criticism of the federal procurement
process, (2) personnel's lack of faith in their weapons,
and even (3) risks to national security if a product fails in
war due to a design flaw.
Fourth, the current defense does not deter either the
government or the contractor from producing poorly
designed products. The pre-Boyle case, In re Air Crash Dis-
aster at Mannheim, Germany on September 11, 1982, demon-
strates this lack of deterrance.t 96 In that case, a helicopter
designed by Boeing-Vertol in accordance with Army mis-
sion and performance requirements crashed killing forty-
six passengers. The court adopted the formulation of the
government contractor defense established by the Ninth
Circuit in McKay.' 97 The Third Circuit then held that the
approval element is satisfied as long as there is "true gov-
ernment participation in the design" amounting to more
than a rubber stamp.' 98 The Third Circuit also found
that, although the Army was aware of the fatal defect and
had refused to implement a correction suggested by Boe-
ing, the government contractor defense still applied be-
cause the specifications for the helicopter represented a
"military judgment."' 99 In this case, potential liability
1" 769 F.2d 115 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986). This prod-
uct liability action was brought by survivors and personal representatives of ser-
vicemen who died in the crash of an Army Chinook helicopter manufactured by
Boeing-Vertol. Id. at 117.
19, Id. at 122. For a discussion of the McKay decision, see supra note 23 and
corresponding text.
"'1 Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, 769 F.2d at 122. The Third Circuit found that
the Army had approved the design because the Army had inspected and modified
the prototype helicopter] had subjected it to rigorous flight tests under severe
conditions, and had disassembled and reassembled it. Id. at 123.
199 Id. at 123-25.
[T]he issue of the Army's knowledge of the sync shaft's tendency to
fail as a result of transmission failure is irrelevant to the government
contractor defense in this case .... [T]he Army knew that the for-
ward transmission was hazardous and that failure of the transmission
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could have created an incentive for the Army to accept
this design change, and thus prevented the needless death
of forty-six crew members and passengers on board that
helicopter. 0°
Imposing liability on the contractor for defective prod-
ucts would make the contractor's bids less competitive be-
cause it would have to pay the higher costs of accidents
and injuries caused by that product. This would lead to
improved designs because, in order to remain competitive
with manufacturers of non-defective products, govern-
ment contractors would improve their products. If the
contractors failed to improve their designs, government
contracts would go to contractors with better products be-
cause their bids would be lower.
Fifth, not all decisions involving the design of military
equipment involve military judgments. Some perform-
ance requirements are completely independent of
whether the product is to be used by the military or by
civilians. Regardless of whether a product is designed for
military or civilian use, it should be designed reasonably.
Another reason for limiting the defense is that the gov-
ernment lacks the technical ability to actively oversee the
development of many types of highly technical products.
Thus, it is arguable whether they truly exercise discretion
in selecting a design.2 ° ' In almost all cases, the contractor
has the greater technical expertise, with contracts often
being awarded based on this expertise.20 2 Design deci-
sions that result in preventable death or injury of service
would precipitate the crash of the helicopter. . . . [T]he Army had
rejected proposed design modifications aimed at preventing such a
transmission failure.
Id. at 124-25.
200 Id. at 118.
20, The government's involvement in designing its own equipment has greatly
decreased over the years. See Hurley, supra note 2, at 240-41. In the past, the
government actually designed much of its own equipment and gave the contractor
detailed specifications based on that design. Now, the government relies substan-
tially, and sometimes totally, on the design expertise of the contractor, with the
government assuming an advisory or monitoring role. Id.
202 Id.
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members should not fall within those military decisions
that deserve special protection from judicial review. 3
VII. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
LIMITATIONS
There are several ways to avoid the far-reaching impli-
cations of the government contractor defense while still
upholding the basic policies on which it is founded. First,
the defense should not be applicable where the contractor
developed engineering specifications based on general
qualitative specifications provided by the government.
Even with government approval, it is questionable
whether the government truly exercises the degree of dis-
cretion contemplated in Dalehite20 4 and interpreted by the
circuit courts as being required under the elements of the
Boyle formulation of the defense.
Secondly, the contractor should be held to a reasonable
standard of care within the military industry. This stan-
dard may be lower than that in a commercial industry due
to the tradeoffs between military performance require-
ments and absolute safety. This would help eliminate the
more obvious defects caused by poor design rather than
by conscious trade-offs between performance and safety.
Thirdly, the courts should implement stricter standards
to find informed approval and reasonably precise specifi-
cations. The active exercise of discretion contemplated
by the Fifth Circuit in Trevino could serve as a standard for
the contractor to meet the defense.
In conclusion, the government contractor defense must
be limited or many of Justice Brennan's predictions may
come true. Otherwise, we are all exposed to possible in-
jury by government equipment, buildings, or products.
Once injured, we may be left without a remedy, the court-
room door closed by the far-reaching impact of the gov-
ernment contractor defense.
203 Id.
- 346 U.S. at 15.
Casenote

